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Abstract:
This paper contains a conceptual replication of Herath and Rao (2009), who tested the Integrated Protection Motivation
Theory (PMT) and General Deterrence Theory (GDT) model of security policy compliance under the umbrella of the
Decomposed Theory of Planned Behavior (DTPB). This study replicates their research model except for the Response
Cost construct. In contrast to the original study, all data for this replication comes from a single organization, and the
survey instrument references a security policy specific to this organization, not generic security policies in multiple
organizations. Our results, based on 437 observations, confirm some of the original findings but not all. Relationships
stemming from Organizational Commitment, Resource Availability, Security Breach concern level and Subjective Norms
are similar across both studies. The findings for other relationships drawn from PMT, GDT, and TPB are mixed. We
believe that the evidence provided in this conceptual replication of the Integrated Model (Herath & Rao, 2009) supports
the robustness of parts of the model. We encourage future research and practice to focus on replicating and confirming
the parts of the model that are similar in both studies.
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1 Introduction
Numerous industry studies and surveys indicate that information systems (IS) security is a top managerial
concern (Willison & Warkentin, 2013). One of the key problems affecting the security of information systems
in organizations is the insider, the trusted employee or contractor with valid access to systems. The
academic community has responded to these concerns by undertaking research focusing on organizational
information security practices as well as individual security behaviors.
This paper is a replication of one such study, (Herath & Rao, 2009). Their paper draws from the areas of
Protection Motivation Theory, General Deterrence Theory, and Organizational Behavior to develop and test
an Integrated Protection Motivation and Deterrence model of security policy compliance under the umbrella
of the Theory of Planned Behavior. Their integrated model examines security compliance in a more holistic
manner, which in our opinion is worthy of replication.
The replication we perform is not an exact replication. It is a conceptual replication, whereby we test the
same hypotheses, but in a different context, and with a different analysis of the data. (Dennis & Valacich,
2014). As noted in Dennis and Valacich’s (2014) manifesto, this type of replication can be the strongest
form of replication, since it applies the same concepts across multiple groups with different cultures. In this
replication, we test their entire model except one construct. Thus, there are three main differences between
the studies. First, while Herath and Rao (2009) administered the instrument to employees at a variety of
organizations, our replication focused on a single company. Second, because of this focus, we slightly
altered the questions to refer to a specific corporate security policy, rather than to security policies generally.
Third, the policy we referred to had recently been changed, a change that affected all employees on the
company network with Internet access. These changes allow us to see whether the model is robust when
used in a single specific environment, when referring to a specific policy, and when that policy has recently
changed. Boundary conditions specific to each of the studies are summarized in Table 1. These are aspects
of the “who, where, and when” of the model (Busse, Kach, & Wagner, 2016).

Table 1. Boundary Conditions
Herath and Rao (2009)

This Study

Number of organizations contacted

690

1

Number of organizations indicating interest

120

1

Number of organizations that actually participated

78

1

Number of employees in each organization

10

1070

Number of usable responses

312

437

According to Deterrence Theory (Straub, 1990), individuals weigh the costs and benefits before engaging
in criminal behavior and choose crime if it pays. Thus, if an individual concludes that there is a high
probability of being caught and the punishment is severe, then they will not engage in criminal behavior
(Mahmood, Siponen, Straub, Rao, & Raghu, 2010; Straub, 1990). Classical deterrence theory posits that
the certainty, severity, and celerity of punishment are factors that guide an individual’s decision to commit
or not commit a crime (Pahnila, Siponen, & Mahmood, 2007). Celerity of punishment refers to how fast
punishment is delivered. General deterrence theory posits that the greater the certainty and severity of
sanctions for a criminal act, the more individuals are deterred from the act (D’Arcy, Hovav, & Galletta, 2009).
General deterrence theory includes three additional factors: social disapproval, self-disapproval, and
impulsivity (Pahnilaa et al., 2007).
Protection Motivation Theory is rooted in fear appeals and postulates that people protect themselves based
on four factors. These four factors arise from the cognitive appraisal of two processes: threat appraisal and
coping response appraisal (Herath & Rao, 2009). Threat appraisal stems from the perceived severity of a
threatening event, and the perceived probability of occurrence or vulnerability. Coping response appraisal
stems from efficacy of the recommended preventive behavior and perceived self-efficacy (Rogers, 1975).
Rational Choice Theory proposes that offenders weigh the costs and benefits of engaging in deviant
behaviors before deciding to act (Li, Zhang, & Sarathy, 2010). Individuals are sensitive to the consequences
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of their behavior and make rational decisions based on a cost-benefit analysis of the intended behavior. The
decision to act in an offending manner is a function of the perceived costs and perceived benefits of the
criminal behavior (Hu, Xu, Dinev, & Ling, 2011). The perceived risks include detection probability, sanction
severity, subjective norms, and security risks (Bulgurcu, Cavusoglu, & Benbasat, 2010).
Based on General Deterrence Theory, Protection Motivation Theory, Theory of Planned Behavior,
Decomposed Theory of Planned Behavior, and Organizational Commitment, Herath and Rao (2009)
developed the following 15 hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1: Attitudes towards information security policies will positively influence security
policy compliance intentions.
Hypothesis 2: The perceived severity of a potential security breach will positively affect the level
of security breach concern.
Hypothesis 3: The perceived probability of a security breach will positively affect the level of
security breach concern.
Hypothesis 4: Higher levels of security breach concern will result in more positive attitudes
towards security policies.
Hypothesis 5: The perceived effectiveness of one's actions will positively affect one's attitude
towards security policies.
Hypothesis 6: The perceived response cost will negatively influence one's attitude towards
security policies.
Hypothesis 7: Self-efficacy will positively influence one's attitude towards security policies.
Hypothesis 8: Self-efficacy will positively affect intention to comply with organizational information
security policies.
Hypothesis 9: Resource availability will positively affect self-efficacy.
Hypothesis 10: The severity of the penalty will positively affect the intention to comply with
organizational information security policies.
Hypothesis 11: The certainty of detection will positively affect the intention to comply with
organizational information security policies.
Hypothesis 12: Subjective norms [expectations of relevant others] will positively affect intention to
comply with organizational information security policies.
Hypothesis 13: Descriptive norms [behavior of similar others] will positively influence intentions to
comply with security policies.
Hypothesis 14: Higher levels of organizational commitment will lead to higher employee
perceptions of the effectiveness of their actions.
Hypothesis 15: The level of organizational commitment will positively affect the intention to follow
security policies.

Figure 1 shows their research model and the results from their data analysis.
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Figure 1. Original Research Model and Related Results
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Methodology

We performed an empirical test of the relationships suggested in their research model on data we collected
using a field study survey. In the following sections, we present the instrument and describe the survey
administration and participants.

2.1 Instrument
We used the same instrument as the original study with adaptations to fit the specific context. The survey
items were updated from referencing generic security policies in multiple companies, to wording that referred
to a recent, specific policy enforcement change in a specific company. These changes to wording, and
administering the survey in a single company, constitute the situational differences between the original
Herath & Rao (2009) paper and this conceptual replication. The firm in which the survey was administered
was a Fortune 100 company, in manufacturing and engineering. The employees to whom the survey was
administered worked in all business areas of the company, not just technical areas. However, all were
geographically at the same campus, not worldwide.
Several weeks before the survey was administered, the company had changed a policy enforcement
mechanism concerning Internet usage throughout the company network. Prior to the change, only a Web
access policy governed employees’ use of the Internet from the company’s network. Like acceptable use
policies at many companies, it prohibited use of the company network for activities such as accessing
pornographic material or promoting outside businesses. When employees attempted to access a site that
was on a blacklist, the system blocked their access and logged the attempt. Excessive attempts by
employees were investigated. In response to some violations that were difficult to track to individuals, the
company added additional enforcement to the policy: employees were now required to login to a portal to
be able to access Internet sites that were not on an approved list. The purpose of the authentication was
to help in tracking violations and to remind employees of the Internet usage policy. The company reported
to us that their detected violations of the Web access policy fell by 44%, but did not cease, in response to
the policy requiring authentication. Our study, administered several weeks after the policy change, was
intended to gauge employee response to the authentication requirement and help the company understand
why the remaining violations occurred.
According to company contacts who had been directly involved in its implementation, the addition of the
authentication enforcement mechanism to the Web access policy, which was done suddenly and without
much warning, caused significant controversy, both because it added an annoying and cumbersome
authentication step and because it emphasized the company’s monitoring of Internet usage. To capitalize
on this raised awareness, we included the following in our survey recruitment email:
“In light of the changes to authenticated web access, the Firewall & Proxy server team at [company]
and researchers at [university] have teamed up on a research project to better understand this and
other IT security policies and their impact on the workplace. . . .”
We did not perform an explicit manipulation check but it is reasonable to assume that the controversy, the
daily login requirement, the recency of the change, and the recruitment email all focused the respondents’
attention on the policy and its enforcement.
We administered the survey using the company’s internal web-based survey system. Unfortunately,
because it was inadvertently left out of the survey, we were unable to include response cost in our model.
Table 2 lists the constructs we used, their measures, and the wording of each of those measures. In place
of the original wording of security violation, we used Internet usage policy violation. In place of organization,
we used company. In place of security technologies, we used Internet authentication.
OCM1
Organizational
commitment

Perceived
probability of
security breach

OCM2
OCM3
IncCert1
IncCert2
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Table 2. Measurement Instrument
I am willing to put in a great deal of effort beyond that normally expected in
order to help this company to be successful.
I really care about the fate of this company.
For me, this is the best of all possible companies in which to work.
How likely is it that an Internet usage policy violation will cause a significant
outage that will result in the loss of productivity?
How likely is it that an Internet usage policy violation will cause a significant
outage to the Internet that results in financial losses to organizations?
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IncCert3
IncSev1
Perceived
severity of
security breach

IncSev2
IncSev3

Security breach
concern level
Response
efficacy

SecConc1
SecConc2
SecConc3
ResEff1
ResEff2
ResEff3
ResAvail1
ResAvail2

Resource
availability

ResAvail3
ResAvail4
ResAvail5
SEff1
Self-efficacy
SEff2
SEff3

Security policy
attitude
Punishment
severity

SecPolAtt1
SecPolAtt2
SecPolAtt3
PunSev1
PunSev2
PunSev3
DetCer1
DetCer2

Detection
certainty

SubNorm1
Subjective norms

SubNorm2
SubNorm3
SubNorm4
SubNorm5
DesNorm1

Descriptive
norms

DesNorm2
DesNorm3

Security policy
compliance
intention

CompInt1
CompInt2
CompInt3
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How likely is it that the company will lose sensitive data due to an Internet
usage policy violation?
I believe that information stored on company computers is vulnerable to
security incidents due to Internet usage policy violations.
I believe the productivity of the company and its employees is threatened by
security incidents due to Internet usage policy violations.
I believe the profitability of the company is threatened by security incidents
due to Internet usage policy violations.
Internet usage issues affect my organization directly.
Internet usage issues are exaggerated.
I think Internet usage is a serious issue and needs attention.
Every employee can make a difference when it comes to helping to secure the
company information systems.
There is not much that any one individual can do to help secure the company
information systems.
If I follow the organization’s Internet usage policies, I can make a difference
in helping to secure my company information systems.
Assistance from the Help Desk is available when needed.
Information security policies, like the Internet usage policy, are made
available to employees online.
Information security policies, like the Internet usage policy are written in a
manner that is clear and understandable.
Users receive adequate security training before getting a network account.
A variety of business communications (notices, posters, newsletters, etc.) are
used to promote security awareness.
I would feel comfortable following most of the Internet usage policy on my
own.
If I wanted to, I could easily follow the Internet usage policy on my own.
I would be able to follow most of the Internet usage policy even if there was
no one around to help me.
Adopting Internet authentication is important.
Adopting Internet authentication is beneficial.
Adopting Internet authentication is helpful.
The organization disciplines employees who break Internet usage rules.
My organization terminates employees who repeatedly break Internet usage
policy rules.
If I were caught violating the company's Internet usage policy I would be
severely punished.
Employee Internet usage is properly monitored for policy violations.
If I violated the company’s Internet usage policy, I would probably be caught.
Top management thinks I should follow company Internet authentication
policies.
My immediate supervisor thinks that I should follow company Internet
authentication policies.
My colleagues think that I should follow company Internet authentication
policies.
The information security department thinks that I should follow company
Internet authentication policies.
Other computer technical specialists in the organization think that I should
follow company Internet authentication policies.
I believe other employees comply with the company’s Internet
authentication policies.
I am convinced other employees comply with the company’s Internet
authentication policies.
It is likely that the majority of other employees comply with the company’s
Internet authentication policies to help protect the organization's information
systems.
I am likely to follow the company’s Internet authentication policies.
It is likely that I will comply with the company’s Internet authentication policies
to protect the organization's information systems.
I am certain that I will follow the company’s Internet authentication policies.
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2.2 Survey administration and participants
We received 1070 responses. Of these, 589 identified as male, 238 identified as female, the rest did not
specify their gender. The table below provides the descriptive statistics. This data includes only those who
reported on the specific items, so all sum to 100%.

Table 3. Descriptive Statistics
Gender

Education

Age

Female
Male
Graduate Degree
Bachelor’s Degree
Some College
High School (other)
18 - 25
26 - 35
36 - 45
46 - 55
56 and older

Count
238
589
162
467
126
39
26
204
238
232
128

%
28.8
71.2
20.4
58.8
15.9
4.9
3.1
24.6
28.7
28.0
15.5

3 Data Analysis
We used SPSS version 22 and Amos version 23 for measurement validation and to test the structural model.
Amos, which employs a structural equation modelling (SEM) statistical technique, was used largely for
confirmation.
We began by screening the data. The first step was to identify and remove any records with missing values.
The next step was to screen for unengaged responses. Any record with a standard deviation of 0.5 or below
was dropped from the data set. This process left us with a sample of size of 437. To assess commonmethod bias, we ran a factor analysis in SPSS with the number of factors fixed to 1 and no rotation. The
un-rotated principal-component factor that emerged explained 21.12% of the variance, which is less than
the critical 50%. Second, the un-rotated principal-component factor analysis revealed twelve factors with
eigenvalues greater than 1. The first factor accounted for 21.12% of the variance. All twelve factors together
accounted for 67.14% of the variance, indicating an acceptable level of common method variance. We
assessed discriminant validity by looking at the correlation matrix. None of the correlations between the
factors exceed 0.7, which is within acceptable range. The Average Variance Extracted (AVE) did not meet
the 0.5 cutoff point for some of the variables; however, we decided to include all the variables in the structural
model.
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Construct

Table 4. Measurement Model Statistics
Item

Organizational commitment
CR = 0.810
AVE = 0.59
Perceived probability of security breach
CR = 0.722
AVE = 0.478
Perceived severity of security breach
CR = 0.833
AVE = 0.716
Security breach concern level
CR = 0.543
AVE = 0.29
Response efficacy
CR = 0.533
AVE = 0.356
Resource availability
CR = 0.734
AVE = 0.245
Self-efficacy
CR = 0.881
AVE = 0.712
Security policy attitude
CR = 0.902
AVE = 0.755
Punishment severity
CR = 0.870
AVE = 0.690
Detection certainty
CR = 0.542
AVE = 0.372
Subjective norms
CR = 0.845
AVE = 0.525
Descriptive norms
CR = 0.820
AVE = 0.606
Security policy compliance intention
CR = 0.818
AVE = 0.601

OCM1
OCM2
OCM3
IncCert1
IncCert2
IncCert3
IncSev1
IncSev2
IncSev3
SecConc1
SecConcR
SecConc3
ResEff1
ResEff2
ResEff3
ResAvail1
ResAvail2
ResAvail3
ResAvail4
ResAvail5
SEff1
SEff2
SEff3
SecPolAtt1
SecPolAtt2
SecPolAtt3
PunSev1
PunSev2
PunSev3
DetCer1
DetCer2

Factor
Loadings
.821
.832
.635
.795
.774
.449
.802
.868
.867
.400
.561
.630
.721
.734
.091
.195
.819
.717
.157
.325
.839
.853
.839
.875
.872
.860
.849
.843
.799
.601
.618

SubNorm1
SubNorm2
SubNorm3
SubNorm4
SubNorm5
DesNorm1
DesNorm2
DesNorm3
CompInt1
CompInt2

.793
.795
.589
.768
.652
.854
.829
.634
.810
.690

CompInt3

.819

CR = Composite Reliability; AVE = Average Variance Extracted

We tested the structural model using Amos version 23. (Herath & Rao, 2009) used SmartPLS to test their
structural model; we chose covariance-based structural equation modelling (CB-SEM) with Amos because
our objective was to confirm that our data fit the model and because we have a larger sample. Two of the
constructs, Subjective Norm and Resource Availability, are formative. Information systems literature has
provided guidelines on how to analyze formative constructs via covariance-based SEM such as AMOS. The
analysis requires the performance of a chi-square test on a number of models to determine which to use
(Petter, Straub, & Rai, 2007). We selected the best model for the analysis (Herath & Rao, 2009), and our
research hypotheses and related results are compared in Figure 2a and Figure 2b below. Like the original
research, we controlled for age, education, gender, and job type.
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Figure 2a. Herath and Rao’s (2009) Research Model and Results.

Figure 2b. Our Model and Related Results
Model fit indices meet the recommended guidelines (Gefen, Straub, & Boudreau, 2000), except for one,
χ2/df. Two other indices, NFI and GFI are borderline close to the cutoff point. Table 5 suggests that the
structural model has an adequate fit with the data.
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Fit Indices
χ2
df
χ2 / df
NFI
GFI
AGFI
CFI
RMSEA

Table 5. Model Fit Indices
Heuristic
Model value
1582.590
773
>3.0
2.047
>0.90
0.859
>0.90
0.850
>0.80
0.824
>0.90
0.922
<0.06
0.049

Our results show that nearly 48% of the variance in the security policy compliance intentions and 41% of
the variance in the security policy attitude are explained in the integrated model.

4 Discussion
Table 6 compares the results of the two studies.
Table 6. Comparison of Findings
Hypothesis
Original Study
Our Study
Comments
H1
0.073
0.147***
Significant in our study
H2
0.191*
0.741***
Exceptional weight in our study
H3
0.065
0.052
Similar findings
H4
0.393***
0.601***
Similar findings
H5
0.288***
0.181
Not significant in our study
H6
-0.195***
Not tested in our study
H7
0.148*
-0.016
Not significant in our study
H8
0.172*
0.112
Not significant in our study
H9
0.505***
0.503***
Similar findings
H10
-0.139**
0.087
Not significant in our study
H11
0.155**
-0.203
Not significant in our study
H12
0.313**
0.454***
Similar findings
H13
0.101*
0.178
Not significant in our study
H14
0.431***
0.431***
Similar findings
H15
0.202***
0.223***
Similar findings
*significant at P < 0.05 level, **significant at P < 0.01 level, ***significant at P < 0.001 level

Behavioral and social sciences research involves three interrelated domains. These are the substantive
domain or content; the conceptual domain which consists of the ideas that give meaning to the content;
and the methodological domain which includes the techniques or procedures by which the content and
ideas are studied (McGrath, 1995). Our replication study uses the same procedure as (Herath & Rao,
2009), a field study using a survey method; we tested the same concepts or research model in a different
context, making this a conceptual replication. The only difference was in the content of interest; they
examined a generic security policy across multiple generic organizations, whereas we examined a specific
security policy in a specific organization. This may explain the differences in some of our results. In the
rest of the section below, we discuss, hypothesis by hypothesis, possible theoretical reasons for the
differences.
H1, H7, and H8 were drawn from three theories: the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB), the Decomposed
Theory of Planned Behavior (DTPB), and Protection Motivation Theory (PMT). Self-efficacy is the
conviction that one can successfully execute the behavior required to produce the outcomes; attitude
refers to the degree to which a person has a favorable or unfavorable evaluation or appraisal of the
behavior in question; and intention is an indication of an individual’s readiness to perform a given
behavior. Herath & Rao (2009) asked their respondents if they could easily and comfortably follow most of
the IS security policies, whereas we asked our participants if they could easily and comfortably follow a
specific Internet usage policy. The findings for these hypotheses are mixed, with the original study
showing self-efficacy influencing both security policy attitudes and intention to comply with policies, but
our study does not show the same effect. The original study found the impact of attitude on policy
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compliance to be insignificant, but out study found the effect to be significant. These results may be
explained by the fact that our instrument referred to specific ‘Internet Usage Policy’ in the Fortune 100
Company, whereas the original study referred to general IS Security policies. Individuals are prone to be
more willing to comply with a specific, concrete policy, which changed in recent memory, than to comply
with generic security policies with details that are at likely only vaguely remembered.
H2, H3, H4, and H5 were drawn from PMT. H6, which we did not test in our model due to inadvertent
omission, was also drawn from PMT. PMT proposes that people protect themselves based on Threat
Appraisal (Perceived Severity and Perceived Susceptibility) and Coping Appraisal (Perceived Response
Efficacy and Perceived Self-Efficacy). The findings for H2, H3 and H4 are similar in both studies. The
beta weight for H2 in our study is high, which could be explained by the high level of Internet security
awareness by the participants in our study. In both studies, the certainty of security breaches has no
significant impact on security concern. On the contrary, Coping Appraisal influenced attitude in their study,
but not in ours. This is an interesting finding that may be explained by the recency of the Internet
authentication policy in the company. A recent policy change, that seems cumbersome to use at first
glance, may influence a user to be unsure about whether they will truly comply.
H12 (Subjective Norm) and H13 (Descriptive Norm) were drawn from two theories, TPB and DTPB. TPB
states that attitude toward behavior, subjective norms, and perceived behavioral control work together to
shape an individual’s behavioral intentions. The original study found that social influence plays a role in
employee security behaviors. Both studies suggest that subjective norms, or the employees’ perception
of what significant others think, have a significant impact on employee behaviors. However, whereas they
found descriptive norms to be significant, our study provides no support for the influence of descriptive
norms. In both studies, the expectations of relevant others are seen as important, but the behavior of
similar others is not seen as significant in our study. In both studies the strength of the relationship is
relatively small compared to that of the subjective norm. This should not be surprising given that what
others do with policy compliance—especially a single policy, in a single organization (our study)—varies
less than what others do among several policies and several organizations. It seems likely that what
individuals think others want them to do varies strongly across individuals, and across organizations and
policies.
H9 was drawn from DTPB. The findings in both studies are similar, both significant at the p < 0.001 level
(0.505 in the original study; 0.503 in our study). Resource availability is important for employee ability to
comply with security policies.
H10 and H11 were drawn from General Deterrence Theory (GDT). These results are significant in the
original study but not in our study. In the original study, they found certainty of detection to have positive
impact on security policy compliance intentions, and the severity of penalty was found to have a significant
impact on security behavior intentions. In our study, H10 and H11 were not found to be significant. In
Herath and Rao, which studied multiple organizations, fear of sanctions varied from organization to
organization while our study of a single organization resulted in less variation. Since H10 and H11 were
not significant in this study, we cannot state conclusively that certainty of detection and severity of
punishment do not work as Herath & Rao showed, but the negative relationship we found bears further
investigation.
H14 and H15 were drawn from Organizational Commitment Theory (OCT). The findings in both studies
are similar, both significant at the p < 0.001 level (H14 was 0.431 original study and is 0.431 in our study;
H15 was 0.202 in the original study and is 0.223 in our study). This seems to indicate that organizational
commitment is a strong force for compliance with policy, whether in the context of a specific firm, or across
multiple firms. This is unsurprising, as those with high organizational commitment tend to be good
employees, who follow rules and contribute to the goals of the company.

5 Conclusion
In this paper, we present a conceptual replication of (Herath & Rao, 2009) study. As shown in Figure 2 and
Table 7, several of the relationships, including those stemming from Organizational Commitment, Resource
Availability, Perceived Severity, and Subjective Norms are remarkably similar across the two studies. Such
consistency suggests that these relationships are robust despite the differences in the two studies. Other
important relationships, however, are not consistent. The central relationships in the Theory of Planned
Behavior between Concern Level and Attitude and between Attitude and Intention are, respectively,
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significant but weak and not significant in Herath and Rao’s (2009) results. In our results, these two are
both significant and stronger than in the previous study, suggesting that the Theory of Planned Behavior
may be a good fit in this context. Finally, the constructs related to General Deterrence Theory and to
Punishment Severity and Detection Certainty were significant in the previous study but not in ours. This
difference is likely due to the security culture and use or non-use of sanctions at the company.
We believe the evidence presented in this conceptual replication of Herath and Rao (2009)
provides
support for the robustness of the Integrated Protection Motivation and Deterrence model. These two
studies, taken together, show that the model is robust across somewhat differing contexts and that small
changes to the instrument do not invalidate the outcomes. These findings agree with a key point in Dennis
and Valacich (2009): namely, they help show that there is nothing idiosyncratic about item wording. To
further strengthen the theories behind the original study, future research should be conducted to validate
that the constructs significant across both these studies remain significant in other scenarios. Similarly,
future studies may show that both significant and non-significant constructs are not applicable in other
contexts, which ultimately can lead to a more parsimonious model.

Volume 4

Paper 7

Transactions on Replication Research

13

References
Bulgurcu, B., Cavusoglu, H., & Benbasat, I. (2010). Information security policy compliance: An empirical
study of rationality-based beliefs and information security awareness. MIS Quarterly, 34(3), 523-548.
Busse, C., Kach, A. P., & Wagner, S. M. (2016). Boundary conditions. Organizational Research Methods,
20(4), 574-609.
D’Arcy, J., Hovav, A., & Galletta, D. (2009). User awareness of security countermeasures and its impact on
information systems misuse: A deterrence approach. Information Systems Research, 20(1), 79 -98.
Dennis, A. R., & Valacich, J. S. (2014). A replication manifesto. AIS Transactions on Replication Research,
1(1), 1-4.
Gefen, D., Straub, D. W., & Boudreau, M.-C. (2000). Structural equation modelling and regression:
Guidelines for research practice. Communications of the Association for Information Systems, 4(7),
1-79.
Herath, T., & Rao, H. R. (2009). Protection motivation and deterrence: A framework for security policy
compliance in organisations. European Journal of Information Systems, 18(2), 106-125.
Hu, Q., Xu, Z., Dinev, T., & Ling, H. (2011). Does deterrence work in reducing information security policy
abuse by employees? Communications of the ACM, 54(6), 54-60.
Johnston, A. C., & Warkentin, M. (2010). Fear appeals and information security behaviors: An empirical
study. MIS Quarterly, 34(3), 549-566.
Li, H., Zhang, J., & Sarathy, R. (2010). Understanding compliance with internet use policy from the
perspective of rational choice theory. Decision Support Systems, 48(4), 635-645.
Mahmood, M. A., Siponen, M., Straub, D., Rao, H. R., & Raghu, T. S. (2010). Moving toward black hat
research in information systems security: An editorial introduction to the special issue. MIS Quarterly,
34(3), 431-433.
McGrath, J.E. (1995) Methodology matters: Doing research in the behavioral and social sciences. In
Human–Computer Interaction: Toward the Year 2000, R.M. Baecker, J. Grudin, W.Buxton, A., and
Greenberg, S., Eds. Morgan Kaufmann Publishers, San Francisco, CA, pp.152–169.
Pahnila, S., Siponen, M., & Mahmood, A. (2007). Employees’ behavior towards IS security policy
compliance. Paper presented at the Proceedings of the 40th Hawaii International Conference on
System Sciences, Hawaii.
Petter, S., Straub, D., & Rai, A. (2007). Specifying formative constructs in information systems research.
MIS Quarterly, 31(4), 623-656.
Rogers, R. W. (1975). A protection motivation theory of fear appeals and attitude change. Journal of
Psychology, 91(1), 93-114.
Straub, D. W. (1990). Effective IS security: An empirical study. Information Systems Research, 1(3), 255276.
Willison, R., & Warkentin, M. (2013). Beyond deterrence: An expanded view of employee computer abuse.
MIS Quarterly, 37(1), 1-20.

Volume 4

Paper 7

14

Protection Motivation and Deterrence: Evidence from a Fortune 100 Company

About the Authors
David Sikolia is an assistant professor at Illinois State University, teaching programming and security
courses. His research interests include information assurance and security. His research has appeared in
peer reviewed scientific journals and conferences such as Pacific Asia Journal of the Association of
Information Systems, Journal of the Midwest Association of Information Systems, and Americas Conference
on Information Systems (AMCIS), and many others.

Douglas Twitchell is an Assistant Professor of Information Technology Management in the College of
Business and Economics at Boise State University. He has published many articles in behavioral
information security and other topics in outlets such as the Journal of Management Information Systems
and Group Decision Making and Negotiation. As a Certified Information Systems Security Professional
(CISSP) and a member of the Special Interest Group on Security in the Association for Information Systems,
he enjoys keeping up with and discussing current advances in information security.

Glen Sagers is a professor in the School of Information Technology at Illinois State University. His research
interests center around human factors in security and information assurance topics, such as wireless
security use.

Copyright © 2018 by the Association for Information Systems. Permission to make digital or hard copies of
all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not
made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and full citation on
the first page. Copyright for components of this work owned by others than the Association for Information
Systems must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on
servers, or to redistribute to lists requires prior specific permission and/or fee. Request permission to publish
from: AIS Administrative Office, P.O. Box 2712 Atlanta, GA, 30301-2712 Attn: Reprints or via e-mail from
ais@aisnet.org.

Volume 4

Paper 7

